On the Invalidation of Terms in Contracts of Adhesion by Tutt, Andrew
Note
On the Invalidation of Terms in Contracts of
Adhesion
Andrew Tuttt
This Note argues that judges should invalidate terms in contracts of
adhesion that place the risk of loss on the costlier cost-avoider or that grant an
option to one of the parties to impose non-reciprocal costs on the other. It goes
on to justify this rule, arguing that it minimizes both the primary and secondary
costs of contracts of adhesion.
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Introduction
Contracts of "adhesion"I remain ubiquitous.2 Yet courts still struggle to
decide when to invalidate their terms.3 Even as courts continue to grapple with
the enforceability question in high stakes consumer contracts cases, they lack a
systematic approach to deciding when the terms in these contracts should be
4overridden. When, if ever, should courts refuse to enforce a term set out in a
contract of adhesion?s
1. The phrase "contract of adhesion" was introduced into the American legal vocabulary by
Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 & n.106
(1919) (noting a similar usage in international law), but made famous by Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 636 (1943) and, later,
Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983). In
a contract of adhesion, the contract is drawn up by the seller and the purchaser, who merely "adheres" to
it, has little choice as to its terms.
2. David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 80
U. CoLo. L. REV. 431, 431 (2009) ("Virtually all modem contracts are standard forms."); Russell
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1203, 1203 (2003) ("[N]early all commercial and consumer sales contracts are form driven."); W. David
Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV.
529, 529 (1971) ("Standard form contracts probably account for more than ninety-nine percent of all the
contracts now made."); see also 5 ARTHuR LiNTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 24.27A, at 193
(rev. ed. Supp. 2012) ("lTJhe bulk of contracts signed in this country are adhesion contracts.").
3. See, e.g., Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and
Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459, 472-79 (1995) (describing varying approaches undertaken by courts
in assessing procedural and substantive elements of unconscionability); Stephen J. Ware, A Critique of
the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461, 1464-66 (1989) (outlining different
judicial responses to insurance policies as adhesion contracts); James J. White, Form Contracts Under
Revised Article 2, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 315, 346-48 (1997) (analyzing different statutory approaches to
invalidating retail contracts). But see Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form
Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 433 (2002) (arguing that "the law ultimately
has coalesced around a workable set of rules that protects consumers from surprise and unfair terms
while supporting the economically beneficial use of standard forms"). Yet when Hillman and Rachlinski
ultimately describe this "workable set of rules" they present not decision rules, but legal doctrines. See
id. at 456 ("The courts have developed legal doctrines that curb form abuse largely from three sources:
the unconscionability doctrine, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 211(3), and the doctrine
of reasonable expectations."). These terms-unconscionability, reasonable expectations, and the like-
are merely labels. They have no meaning without an underlying theory. While these doctrines may be
the legal "hooks" through which courts channel decision rules, they do not themselves decide the cases.
4. This lack of consensus was on display recently in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, a
high profile Supreme Court case from the 2011 Term. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). In Concepcion, five
justices held that California's rule invalidating contract terms designed to "deliberately cheat large
numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money" was grounded in no objectively
rational theory of unenforceability. Id. at 174647. The rule, in other words, was no different than any
other arbitrary reason the California courts might have given for striking an arbitration clause from a
contract of adhesion. Id. at 1747. The four-justice dissent in Concepcion disagreed, arguing that the rule
was as justified as it was obvious. Id. at 1760-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But rather than a
thoroughgoing endorsement of California's rule, the dissent confined its discussion of the economic
rationality of the California rule to a pair of sentences, sidestepping tricky questions of efficiency and
fairness, Id. at 1761.
5. For a sampling of proposals, see, for example, Korobkin, supra note 2, at 1245 (arguing for
a hybrid approach in which legislatures impose mandatory terms and courts exercise limited judicial
review of seller provided terms, thus avoiding the promulgation of a general theory, recommending
instead an institutional design); Rakoff supra note 1, at 1242 (arguing that courts should enforce
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This Note offers a rule for deciding when a term set out in a contract of
adhesion should not be enforced. In the context of a form consumer contract,
where a term reduces the overall surplus associated with the contract6-either
by placing the risk of loss on the class for whom the prevention of the loss is
more costly, or allowing one class to behave strategically at the expense of the
other--courts should not enforce it.7 This straightforward, economically-
grounded, consumer welfare oriented rule could help to bring coherence to this
unsettled area of law, and provide sound guidance to the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, an agency that now possesses sweeping powers to regulate
consumer contracts.8
The remainder of this Note explains why this rule is superior to other
approaches put forth for deciding when to invalidate terms in contracts of
adhesion. Part I explains what contracts of adhesion are, how they differ from
the conventional contract paradigm, and why scholars have not yet advanced a
satisfactory theory for invalidating their terms. Part II then argues that striking
out terms in contracts of adhesion that place the risk of loss on the class or
category for whom prevention is more costly maximizes social welfare.
I. An Introduction to Contracts of Adhesion
Contracts of adhesion are form contracts, offered on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis, usually by a seller of a good or service.9 Consumers enter into contracts
of adhesion more than any other kind of contract.1o Indeed, for many
standard terms when the form provider can establish that they are "important to the preservation of the
ability of firms to initiate new enterprises and practices, and that such enforcement thereby contributes
concretely to the functioning of business as a social force independent of governmental control"); and
Slawson, supra note 2 (presenting part of the economic explanation of why form contracts may be
problematic but offering as the only guidance to courts, in determining what terms to enforce, the
suggestion that the terms be fair, democratic, and in the public interest).
6. Throughout this Note, the terms efficiency and welfare-maximizing are meant to refer to the
overall surplus associated with the contract, to the parties to the contract.
7. See Korobkin, supra note 2, at 1284 (arguing that courts should consider socially inefficient
terms substantively unconscionable); cf Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict
Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972) (suggesting that in the context of any strict liability
regime (of which contracting is one), "[tihe question for the court [of who should bear the cost of the
loss] reduces to a search for the cheapest cost avoider"); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness
Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1161-62 (2001) (suggesting that "one would refer to the
parties' mutually ideal complete contract as a source for terms that would make the parties better off' in
deciding how to rewrite contracts of adhesion). Note that the "risk of loss" idea here presented is meant
to encompass the risks associated with opportunistic behavior as well. See Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827,
830 (2006) (noting that "the optimal set of contract terms does not depend only on the relative costs and
benefits associated with particular terms. It also depends on the relative propensity of the parties to
behave opportunistically"); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case
Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1460 (2004) (describing the option
to behave opportunistically as part of the risk of loss for which all contracts must account).
8. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2006); Dodd-Frank Act § 1032, 12
U.S.C. § 5532 (2006).
9. See sources cited supra note 1.
10. See sources cited supra note 2.
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consumers it is possible they have never entered into the "ordinary" two-party
negotiated contracts taught in a first-year contracts course. Yet even though
contracts of adhesion are the most common kinds of contracts, they differ from
negotiated contracts in one critical respect-because they are offered on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis, the adhering party generally enters into them without
manifesting knowing and voluntary consent to all their terms.I1
This difference between contract doctrine's vision of the contract as an
agreement bargained over by two fully informed rational parties and the reality
of a world where one party is ordinarily unable to negotiate any of the
contract's terms has been a longstanding tension in the law of contracts. On one
hand, contracts of adhesion are a welfare-enhancing feature of modern
commercial life. For firms, the very uniformity and rigidity of such contracts
makes them valuable as a means of reducing agency costs and fixing
expectations of future obligations.12 For consumers, not having to bargain is
valuable as well. The costs of reading, understanding, and bargaining over
every term in such contracts would be enormous. 13 On the other hand, contracts
of adhesion carry their own special risks. To those who value fairness, when
these contracts contain exceptionally one-sided and surprising terms, they
appear deeply unfair.14 To those who mainly prize social-welfare, the contracts
can be seen as reducing overall consumer welfare to the extent that they
possess inefficient terms.
Whatever one's thoughts on their balance of fairness and unfairness or
benefits and costs, scholars and courts have failed to generate an adequate
theory-and therefore a useful and rational rule-for deciding when (if ever) it
is appropriate to invalidate provisions in contracts of adhesion. 15 As one scholar
recently put it, "[i]n few other fields, even in law, has conventional thought
been so fused in amber." 6 Courts invalidate terms because they are
"unconscionable," or invalidate terms that impose unfair surprise, or invalidate
11. See Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1179-80. There is no hard and fast rule about what constitutes
a contract of adhesion. Courts generally use a variety of criteria for determining when a contract
possesses adhesive qualities. Even if there is ambiguity at the edges, however, there is consensus that
insurance policies, real estate contracts, cell phone contracts, cable contracts, consumer products
contracts, software licenses, and "clickwrap" and "browsewrap" agreements are firmly in the "adhesion"
category. See Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in Electronic Contracting: Minimum Standards for Non-
Negotiated Contracts, 42 Hous. L. REv. 1041, 1053 (2005) and sources cited therein, describing indicia
of adhesion, such as presentation in a standard form, use in consumer transactions, drafting for a
generalized rather than particularized commercial transaction, and offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
12. The firm's agents, for example, cannot vary the terms in a manner that is harmful to the
firm. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory ofthe Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 308 (1976) (discussing agency costs and
how firms attempt to reduce them).
13. See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1226.
14. See Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 627, 638-40
(2002). For further discussion of the distinction between welfare and fairness, see Ward Farnsworth, The
Taste for Fairness, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1992, 2015-17 (2002) (book review).
15. See sources cited supra note 3.




terms that are against public policy, but because courts and scholars have not
managed to provide a framework for understanding what aspects of a contract
of adhesion should be legally relevant to its enforceability, the reasons courts
give for labeling a contract term unconscionable, unfairly surprising, or against
public policy, remain markedly inconsistent.
A. How the Debate Over Enforceability Became "Frozen in Amber"
Three stumbling blocks have thwarted progress in the development of a
framework for deciding when to invalidate terms in contracts of adhesion. First
is the persistence of consent-based theories of adhesion. Because consent forms
the bedrock justification for ordinary contract enforcement, many scholars have
argued and continue to argue that consent can workably support the
enforcement (or justify the non-enforcement) of contracts of adhesion as well.
But because one of the primary benefits of contracts of adhesion is that the
parties are not required to negotiate and consent to every term, these theories
are puzzling-they would base invalidation on the one feature that most
prominently sets these contracts apart from negotiated contracts. The second
stumbling block is the continuing focus on whether terms in contracts of
adhesion are likely to be generally efficient or inefficient. This argument,
which animates so much of the scholarship in this area, has one central flaw-
whether the question is answered one way or the other does little to help courts
fashion a rule for deciding actual cases. Finally, the third and strongest
roadblock to putting forward a theory for invalidating terms in contracts of
adhesion is that it is nearly impossible to tell when terms are fair or unfair. Yet
this final argument is flawed as well, because the rule for invalidating terms in
contracts of adhesion need not be perfect, it need only be the best rule among
the realm of available alternatives.
17. See, e.g., Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 985 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that a contract may be adhesive "even if the customer has a meaningful choice as to service
providers"); Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1283 (9th Cir. 2006); Phila. Indem. Ins. Co.
v. Barerra, 21 P.3d 395, 402, 404 (Ariz. 2001) (holding that car rental agreement was adhesive);
Woodruff v. Bretz, Inc., 218 P.3d 486, 491 (Mont. 2009) (citing Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54
P.3d I (Mont. 2002)); Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1003 (Wash. 2007) (holding that
cellular telephone service contract was unconscionable); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d
1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (finding terms denying class-wide relief presumptively unenforceable where the
contracts gave rise to predictable small damages), abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 172 (Cal. 1981) ("[A] contract of
adhesion is fully enforceable . . .unless certain other factors are present which, under established legal
rules ... operate to render it otherwise."); James M. Gaitis, The Ongoing Federalization of Commercial
Arbitration in Montana, MONT. LAW., April 2005, at 12; Korobkin, supra note 2, at 1258-78 (describing
enormous number ofiudicial approaches to defining contractual "unconscionability").
18. Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract Theory, 75 CALF. L.
REV. 1969, 1978-79 (1987); see also Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory
Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 697, 703 (1990) ("If not for Randy Barnett, I might be
accused of creating a straw man in the form of the libertarian literal consent theorist."); id. at 706-09
(describing Richard Posner's theory of contractual consent).
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1. The Puzzling Persistence of Consent-Based Theories
First among the stumbling blocks to developing a framework for
invalidating terms in contracts of adhesion has been many courts' and scholars'
desire to forcibly fit contracts of adhesion into the broader family of negotiated
contracts, even though it is not clear that contracts of adhesion belong there.
Supporters of this view focus their analysis of whether terms in a contract of
adhesion should be enforced based on the individuated consent and bargaining
power of the two parties to the agreement. Their goal is to reach the question of
whether the consumer knowingly and rationally understood what the terms in
the contract he or she was signing meant. This framework is best exemplified
by the famous (or infamous) case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Company, where Judge J. Skelly Wright focused almost entirely on whether the
individual party to the contract-who had little formal education -gave a
legally valid consent to the Walker-Thomas Furniture Company's contract
terms. 20
This approach is problematic for a number of reasons. It will either be
underinclusive and incredibly costly to administer or overinclusive and entirely
unmoored from pertinent economic consideration. If courts were to administer
unconscionability analysis on a case-by-case basis like this, it would chill the
market for consumer contracts and raise the cost of litigation immensely.
Parties would have incentives to cheat and gamble on litigation. Courts would
have to attempt to discern the individual legal capacities of the parties agreeing
to a contract of adhesion on a case-by-case basis. While discerning the consent
of the parties is central to ordinary negotiated contracts-where the terms are
particular to the two parties who negotiated them-it makes little sense for
form consumer contracts that are entered into by potentially thousands of
consumers.
Some scholars try to rehabilitate consent-based theories by arguing that
they can be broadened to the idea of an "objective" mass-market consent.
Rather than assessing the legal capacities of the particular parties before the
court, courts could look to the nature of the instrument and decide whether the
term is generally unenforceable because the term is unfairly surprising or
unconscionable to too many consumers. Some theorists have advocated this
approach, arguing that Courts should invalidate terms in contracts of adhesion
that are "radically unexpected." 21 The problem with this approach and others
19. 198 A.2d 914, 915 (D.C. 1964).
20. 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
21. Barnett, supra note 14, at 637 ("If, therefore, a realistic interpretation of what clicking 'I
agree' means is 'I agree to be legally bound to (unread) terms that are not radically unexpected,' then
that-and nothing more-is what has been consented to objectively."); see also Joshua Fairfield, The
Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1447 (2009) ("I
posit that courts are often not using unconscionability analysis to target standard terms or standardized
contracts. A contract that truly reflects the industry standard-and thus is the most standardized-is




that attempt to generalize a consent-based understanding is that it essentially
unmoors contract doctrine from welfare and fairness considerations and says
that contract enforceability should really depend only on the amount of
information consumers generally possess. For instance, when courts attempt to
apply the unfair surprise standard by looking to the terms that are ordinarily
employed in the relevant market the court unintentionally creates a paradox-
the more commonly firms employ a socially inefficient term the more likely
courts will be to uphold it because consumers are not surprised by it.22
Moreover, it seems that consent only enters the analysis as a relevant
consideration because contracts of adhesion in form resemble "contracts." But
in substance contracts of adhesion are nothing like negotiated contracts.
Because they are meant to be employed across potentially thousands of
consumers, both firms and consumers prefer that consumers not hire attorneys
to pore over the boilerplate in every contract that they sign and try to get the
terms changed. In other words, both consumers and firms would rather not
require that consumers negotiate and consent to every term in the contracts that
they sign. This makes the idea that terms in such contracts should be enforced
or invalidated on the basis of "consent" to any particular term puzzling.23
Moreover, it is worth noting that staking out a position that contracts of
adhesion should be scrutinized more carefully and judicially altered more often
than ordinary contracts is not inconsistent with a belief in the "freedom to
contract" under most other circumstances.24 This is because the elements of
contract-formation, performance, and breach-are conceptually fluid.
Contracts of adhesion exist on one of the distant poles of this spectrum,
involving little in the way of negotiation and informed consent. Thus, to the
objection that invalidating terms in these contracts might deprive consumers of
the ability to specifically contract for desired terms, there are two
counterarguments. First, such terms can still be obtained through another
form-a contract that does not possess the indicia of adhesion. Second, to the
extent that invalidating inefficient terms impinges on autonomy, one is left to
22. Cf Louis Kaplow, Direct Versus Communications-Based Prohibitions on Price Fixing, 3
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 449, 453 (2011) (describing a similar phenomenon in antitrust law wherein under
current law, the markets where it is easiest for rivals to set high prices in parallel are actually less, rather
than more, likely to give rise to liability). This paradox is also a problem in Fourth Amendment
"reasonable expectations of privacy" jurisprudence. The Court and scholars have often worried about the
idea that expectations of privacy are intimately tied to what the judiciary ultimately allows the State to
do, creating a kind of paradox. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring) ("the Katz expectation-of-privacy test. . . . involves a degree of circularity"); Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (observing that the test "has often been criticized as circular");
Priscilla J. Smith et al., When Machines Are Watching: How Warrantless Use of GPS Surveillance
Technology Violates the Fourth Amendment Right Against Unreasonable Searches, 121 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 177, 194 (2011) (arguing courts can and should avoid interpretations that render the test
circular).
23. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 18, at 716; Fairfield, supra note 21, at 1426.
24. To this notion even Randy Bamett, a prominent libertarian legal scholar, agrees. See
Barnett, supra note 14, at 637 ("[T]he enforcement of some form terms may be subject to additional
constraints that would not apply to expressly negotiated terms.").
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ask how often a fully informed rational party would voluntarily choose to
contract for an inefficient term. While some contractual terms can be difficult
to value accurately (a problem that often arises in the context of consideration
doctrine) many inefficient clauses in contracts of adhesion are susceptible to
valuation and therefore may be capable of intelligent judicial appraisal ex post.
2. The Wrong Question: On the Likely Efficiency of Terms in
Contracts of Adhesion
Scholars of law and economics, recognizing the distinction between
negotiated contracts and contracts of adhesion, shifted the debate from one
about whether a particular consumer gave a legally valid consent to a
discussion about whether the terms in contracts of adhesion are generally likely
or unlikely to be efficient.25 Thus, the perspective of most (but not all) 26 of
those who analyze contracts of adhesion has shifted-from an atomized debate
about whether individual consumers gave legally valid consent to individual
contract terms-to a market-based view.27 Law and economics scholars began
to debate market rationality. Many argued that the terms in the consumer
contract are part of the good or service over which firms in the market compete.
As such, either competition to offer the best goods at the lowest price, or the
28desire for monopoly profits, would drive sellers to make their terms efficient.
25. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 7, at 830; Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral
Economics: Human Errors and Market Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 111-123 (2006) (arguing
that markets are likely to remain efficient even in the face of systematic cognitive error, and that as such,
terms in consumer contracts should not be policed except for cases of outright fraud); George L. Priest,
A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981); Alan Schwartz & Louis L.
Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security
Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1392-93 (1983) [hereinafter Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information];
Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal
and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 638 (1979) [hereinafter Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening
in Markets].
26. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 14, at 639-40; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain
Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1982) (arguing that the twin-touchstones of contractual
obligation are fairness and efficiency, and where either is lacking, contracts should not be enforced to
their letter, regardless of market efficiency); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive
Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980) (offering a robust defense of comprehensive contractual regulation as a
mechanism of achieving distributive justice, regardless of market efficiency); Margaret Jane Radin,
Reconsidering Boilerplate: Confronting Normative and Democratic Degradation, 40 CAP. U. L. REV.
617, 619 (2012) [hereinafter Radin, Reconsidering Boilerplate]; Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A
Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78,
164 (2011). See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012) (describing the problems with contracts of adhesion not as
rooted in concerns over economic efficiency but rather as primarily rooted in concerns over democratic
legitimacy).
27. With which this Note primarily concerns itself. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 7, at
1160-61 (arguing that "notions of fairness ... are likely to lead us astray by favoring legal rules that
make both parties worse off-for no apparent reason."). But see Randy E. Barnett, . . .And Contractual
Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 421 (1993) (providing a spirited defense of other methods of
arguments as at least equal in legitimacy to law-and--economics arguments).
28. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 7, at 828-29 (making this point); Kaplow &
Shavell, supra note 7, at 1160 n.467 (making the same point).
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Under this framework, many scholars concluded that contracts of adhesion
should always be enforced because their terms are likely to be systematically
efficient. This avoids the need to analyze whether there was sufficient
"consent" to the contract's terms.
The problem with this view is that unfair terms frequently appear in
contracts of adhesion. Thus, the trend in modern scholarship has been to
attempt to disentangle this contradiction. While economic theorists argue that
form consumer contracts are efficient almost all the time, a large number of
consumer contracts appear surprisingly inequitable. 29
As such, contracts theorists have offered a number of rationales for the
observed divergence between economic theory and actual contract terms. First,
behaviorists argue that systematic cognitive biases mean that consumers are
unable to adequately process unfair terms and that therefore the terms are likely
to be inefficient in settings where those errors are made. On the other hand,
old-style law and economics scholars have argued that the unfair terms
phenomenon arises from features of the market for contracts that cannot be
directly observed. Either much of the market for contracts of adhesion trades on
reputation-and therefore, an implicit promise by drafters that they will not
enforce their one-sided terms 3 -or instead on implicit compensation for failing
to embed an unfair term into the product itself. As an example of this latter
phenomenon, a consumer contract might bar the copying and redistribution of a
particular piece of intellectual property rather than cause the program to disable
itself when copying or redistribution are attempted. Under these theories, the
terms may still be efficient even though they appear inefficient on their surface.
Alexander Bickel once famously remarked "[n]o answer is what the
wrong question begets." 34 He could easily have been referring to this captious
debate. Because even if we answered the question of whether or not contracts
of adhesion are likely to possess efficient terms, that still lends little insight into
how a court should decide whether a specific term challenged in a specific
contract of adhesion should or should not be held unenforceable. While the
likelihood of inefficient terms might tell us something about the accuracy of
judicial decisions (whether we are invalidating too many terms or too few), it
29. See, e.g., Craig Horowitz, Reviving the Law of Substantive Unconscionability: Applying
the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Excessively Priced Consumer Credit
Contracts, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 940, 960 (1986); David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 Nw. U. L.
REV. 387, 388 (2012); Jonathan Klick, The Microfoundations of Standard Form Contracts: Price
Discrimination vs. Behavioral Bias, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 555, 556 (2005); Rakoff, supra note 1, at
1229, 1237-38.
30. Korobkin, supra note 2, at 1233.
31. Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 7, at 833-34.
32. Baird, supra note 16, at 934.
33. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996); Rockwell
Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991).
34. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 103 (1962).
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gives us no way of improving their precision (whether we are invalidating the
right terms).
Thus, while much time and effort has been devoted to arguing about
whether the terms in contracts of adhesion are generally likely to be efficient or
inefficient, courts have been left to struggle to answer the question of whether
the specific term in the specific contract before the court should be enforced.
Their solution has been to fashion ad hoc, largely undertheorized (or, on
occasion, entirely theory-less3 5) legal doctrines combining elements of the
market-centric and consent based theories set forth by scholars. Some seem to
buy the market-based view in which case the decision in any unconscionability
case is an easy one: enforce the terms. Others argue that certain baseline
notions of fairness should bound the possible terms that can be placed in such
contracts. This Note argues for a third way-that courts should strike terms that
are economically inefficient, while preserving terms that, even if "unfair" are
not economically inefficient.
3. But Can Courts Really Police the Efficiency of Individual Terms in
Contracts of Adhesion?
Perhaps this undue emphasis on consent and markets stems merely from
path dependence-arising from an original understanding of contracts of
adhesion as tools for the exercise of monopoly or "unequal bargaining"
power.3 Perhaps it stems from motivated reasoning-a desire to explain why
the pervasive culture of contracts of adhesion works (or at least seems to work)
well much of the time. After all, perhaps contracts of adhesion work well all of
the time and therefore courts should ignore their intuitions about fairness and
welfare because those intuitions are wrong-the terms are efficient even if they
do not look it.
But the more likely reason that scholars avoid treading the dangerous
territory of actually proposing an economically grounded judicial rule for
35. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(grounding the doctrine of unconscionability in fairness, reasonableness, outrageousness, and the
meaningfulness of consumer choice); accord Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Pevarski, 932 N.E.2d
887, 895-96 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (quoting and applying Williams). Courts nationwide and at every
level continue to cite favorably to the unconscionability test set out in Williams. See, e.g., Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 600-01 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Even taking the
Williams test at face value, we still lack a theory about how to determine what is outrageous, unfair, or
unreasonable. When Professor Barnett proposes that a consent's validity be grounded in whether a term
is "radically unexpected," see Barnett, supra note 14, at 639, it is at least ascertainable what the judge
should do: look to other firms in the same market to decide if the term is common or take consumer
surveys to decide if consumers know about it. While Barnett's approach might itself be criticized as
vague, it is at least easier to apply than a standard that calls upon judges to assess reasonableness,
meaningfulness, and outrageousness without any guidance whatsoever as to how to determine what
those terms mean.
36. It is unclear from the case law whether the concept defined by "unequal bargaining power"
represents monopoly power or something else. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 7, at 1160




invalidating terms in contracts of adhesion is that "efficiency" arguments are
often thought to be normatively contingent and easily manipulated." They
depend "in a major way on what kind of general character we attribute to large
numbers of people of whom we have little concrete knowledge."38 Whether a
given term is efficient or inefficient "all depends on empirical data that no one
ever seems to have ready to hand."3 9
As such, it has been argued, neither a judge in an individual case, nor a
scholar in the abstract, could declare a term or category of terms to be efficient
or inefficient with any degree of confidence. This insight is often left unstated
by scholars but, nevertheless, it is powerful. After all, merely knowing that
sellers can shape fine print to favor them and disadvantage buyers-
[D]oes not tell us the extent to which preventing sellers from playing games with fine print
should be the focus of the regulator. Protecting against this form of potential abuse may be
inconsistent with creating rules that make it easy for sophisticated buyers to search. We need
to know something about how powerfully the forces of competition push sellers to offer
efficient terms and how much they are tempted to engage in advantage-taking. 4o
But even as powerful as this critique is, scholars and courts have taken it
too far because they have used this analysis to argue that because no perfect
theory can be put forward guaranteeing that the right terms will be invalidated,
no theory should be put forward at all and that everything should be left to the
market. But that conclusion-invalidate nothing-is not supported by the
critique itself.4'
First, the empirical argument that courts cannot determine whether a given
term is efficient or inefficient is overstated. Many inefficient terms are so
palpably inefficient that courts would have no trouble determining them to be
so. One need not examine the state of competition in the industry or perform
sophisticated longitudinal studies of buyer behavior to conclude, for instance,
that form consumer contracts granting merchants the unilateral right to alter the
contract's terms whenever they wish and at no cost should be invalidated.42
Second, when scholars and courts use the argument that "all economic
arguments are ultimately empirical and potentially unresolvable" to justify not
regulating the market at all, they are making their own contingent claim: that
markets will do a better job of increasing overall consumer welfare than any
other approach. But arguing that efficiency-based decisions are difficult to
make does not mean that the market's decisions are automatically superior.
37. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort
Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV.
563, 597-604 (1982).
38. Id. at 600 n.16.
39. Id. at 603.
40. Baird, supra note 16, at 937.
41. This is a criticism to which the majority in Concepcion is also vulnerable.
42. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments,
57 UCLA L. REV. 605,666 (2010).
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Even if it is difficult to tell when terms are inefficient, it does not follow that
therefore the market should determine all contract terms. An analogous
rationale supports the courts' interventions to remedy antitrust violations. When
law and economics scholars argue that terms in contracts of adhesion should
never be invalidated, they seem to implicitly ignore the legitimate economic
arguments for intervention in the antitrust context. If antitrust is legitimate,
there must be at least some occasions when markets fail. If that is so, it is
unclear why the market for terms in contracts of adhesion would be any
different.
B. What a Theory ofInvalidation Requires
The upshot of this analysis is that, to justify itself, any rule for
invalidating the terms in contracts of adhesion must show that it would do a
better job than the current regime-in which courts invalidate contracts of
adhesion in a haphazard fashion-and would do a better job than many
economists' recommended regime-where courts would simply enforce terms
in every case.
The goal of this Note is to show that the rule proposed herein is better
than the alternatives. My argument is that terms that place the risk of loss on
the costlier cost-avoider are almost always inefficient by reducing overall social
welfare and therefore, absent significant countervailing considerations should
ordinarily be invalidated. My goal is to show that this rule is superior to the
current composite of consent and economic theories courts apply, and superior
to the always-enforce model favored by many economists. In the Part that
follows, I set out and defend this thesis.
II. How Placing the Risk of Loss on the Cheapest Cost Avoider Minimizes
the Costs of Contracting
The rule that the terms in contracts of adhesion should be enforced if they
place the risk of loss on the class for whom preventing the loss is cheapest, and
invalidated otherwise, maximizes social welfare as a matter of both primary
and secondary costs.4 First, the rule minimizes primary costs by ensuring that
43. Even the harshest modern critics of antitrust jurisprudence agree that the antitrust laws-
which prevent firms from engaging in certain business techniques that reduce consumer welfare-and
their enforcement by courts, has been a success in at least some subset of cases. See ROBERT H. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 263 (1993) (agreeing that with respect to the
longstanding per se rule against classic cartel behavior such as price fixing and market division, antitrust
law's "contributions to consumer welfare over the decades have been enormous.").
44. As used in this Note, "primary costs" describe the possible advantage-taking in which
firms might engage in the direct distribution of the risk of loss between the parties to the contract.
"Secondary costs," on the other hand, consist of those costs imposed on society in reacting to and
controlling primary costs. Primary costs might be thought of as costs internal to the contract such as
costs associated with the contract's risk-distribution and the opportunities for strategic behavior it




parties to contracts will expend the optimal amount of resources to prevent
contract breaches, thereby maximizing the mutual contractual surplus. Second,
the rule minimizes secondary costs by, foremost, directing courts to invalidate
the proper terms-terms that that are socially inefficient rather than unfair 45 -
but also by increasing the degree of certainty that parties have as to their legal
obligations to one another, curtailing incentives to engage in strategic behavior,
dispensing with costly mandatory disclosure rules, and calling on judges to
make decisions for which they are institutionally well-suited. Unless judges are
going to enforce the provisions of contracts of adhesion in literally ever case
(an enforcement regime that this Note argues is socially inefficient46), the
decision rule presented here is the proper one. The question then turns from
what the rule should be to what degree of certainty judges should have in their
conclusion that a term is socially inefficient before invalidating it.
Section A explains why an ideal complete contract between buyers and
sellers would place the risk of loss on the class best able to prevent it, and then
further shows that such contract terms reduce the overall primary cost of such
contracts, thereby increasing the overall contractual surplus. Section B explains
why such a rule also minimizes secondary contract costs because it discourages
only those contracts that are socially suboptimal while imposing fewer false-
positives, and demanding less adjudicative resources than other regimes for
invalidating terms in contracts of adhesion.
A. Minimization ofPrimary Costs
In an ideal complete contract, the parties would seek to maximize their
mutual gain.47 Ordinarily this entails placing the risk of loss on the party for
whom preventing the loss is cheapest. After all, if A can bear the risk more
cheaply than B, they are both better off if A bears the risk and they divide the
resulting gain. The question of who should bear the risk is made more
complicated if A can bear the risk of loss more cheaply than B, but placing the
risk of loss on A will allow A to behave opportunistically. If the opportunity to
behave strategically allows A to impose costs on B larger than the mutual gain
to be expected from placing the risk of loss on A, the contract will need to
either include some mechanisms for constraining A's opportunities to engage in
strategic behavior or will need to divide the risk of loss differently so as to
avoid the cost of A's opportunism.
Even though these game-theoretic point-counterpoint concerns can mean
that some sophisticated contracts involve complex risk-sharing and bonding
administering lawsuits over the contract, or arising out of party incentives that result from enforcing or
invalidating contractual provisions.
45. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 7, at 1160-61.
46. See infra Subsection I.B..
47. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 7, at 1121-22 and sources cited therein (defining the notion
of the "mutually ideal complete contract").
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schemes, in consumer contracts it is often far easier to discern that a contract of
adhesion inefficiently divides the risk of loss between the parties (either by, for
example, placing the risk of loss on the purchaser48 or granting the seller an
"option" to behave strategically without any obvious bonding measures in place
to prevent him from doing so).49 The reason is that contracts of adhesion are
contracts to which only one of the parties controls (and is often even aware of)
the terms. Complex risk-distribution and bonding schemes do not appear
because the customer is not likely to even know that such tools for checking the
seller's strategic behavior are available.50 As such, the vast majority of form
consumer contracts merely contain provisions specifying the liabilities of the
parties in the event of a breach-i.e., distributing the risk of loss. This should
make detecting inefficient terms in form consumer contracts significantly more
tractable than detecting inefficient terms in other kinds of contracts. 5
Moreover, in archetypical contracts cases, courts enforce the written terms
because the parties have negotiated over the division of a contractual surplus
known to both. Because they are completely informed and the court is not,
there are strong reasons for upholding the terms of bargained contracts. Often
parties, more than courts, can better tailor the distribution of risk in negotiated
52contracts to their own idiosyncratic preferences. Additionally, even as
transactions become more complex and transaction costs increase, the parties
themselves often better manage their incentives to engage in strategic behavior
in both performance and at the time of litigation. 53 While the primary risk-
distribution in the contract may be suboptimal (in the sense that the overall
contractual surplus is not as large as it might have been), because the parties
bargained over the terms and freely submitted to them, enforcing them as
48. Warranty disclaimers fit this model. See infra Subsection II.A.I.
49. Provisions denying plaintiffs the ability to aggregate their claims in light of the possibility
of predictable, small contractual breaches are a good example.
50. See Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the
Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REv. 215, 280 (1990).
51. For a more complete discussion of this thesis, see infra Subsection II.B.3.
52. This conception is captured by the "bargain model" of contract, characterized by low
transaction costs. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General
Theory ofContractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 968 n.5 (1983) and sources cited therein.
53. This is the "transaction costs" model of contract. Id. at 969 n.5. For more detailed analysis,
see, for example, Oliver Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979) (describing optimal governance structures for different types of
contractual relationships, and arguing that in the case of complex, non-recurrent, idiosyncratic
transactions, the optimal regime is either "bilateral" or "trilateral"-essentially, detailed two-party





written is often the best approach. 54 Parties, better than the courts, can
determine which contract terms they value.ss
Because by definition contracts of adhesion are contracts over which the
parties have not bargained, and to which one of the parties is assumed to be
unable to modify the terms, a different theory must be invoked to justify their
enforcement. The terms proposed by the seller structure the contractual
relationship as readily as the tort regime structures social relationships.56 For
this reason, in the case of contracts of adhesion, it is not clear that government-
mandated rules would be inferior to allowing sellers to write the contracts. 7 In
fact, no scholar (at least of law and economics)5 would argue that a term in a
contract of adhesion that places the risk of loss on the party less able to prevent
it should be enforceable (unless, for whatever reason, the term is not enforced
as written).59 Rather, they make the more roundabout argument that such terms
are not likely to appear in such contracts. They argue that in a rational market,
either competition or the desire for monopoly profits will drive sellers to make
their terms efficient-which means maximizing the overall contractual surplus
and therefore placing risks of loss on the parties best able to prevent them.60
Thus, their arguments are institutional rather than empirical: courts are not well
placed to determine which distribution of risk is cost-minimizing, but, luckily,
the market will work itself clean.
54. Importantly, the terms themselves form an aspect of the division of the contractual surplus.
See Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real
World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 589-90 (1990).
55. See, e.g., ROBERT E. SCort & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 23-29 (4th
ed. 2007) (noting that courts generally enforce bilateral contracts as written because they
think enforcing those promises as written, rather than attempting to improve upon the bargain ex post,
enhances allocative efficiency); see also Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An
Examination ofthe Basis ofContract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1265-66 & n.18, 1322 (1980) (noting that the
traditional justification for enforcing bargained-for exchanges is that it encourages value-maximizing
resource allocations, but refining this understanding by noting that enforcement rules themselves affect
the amount and kind of promise-making, concluding ultimately that contract law enforces promises
where such enforcement is efficient and accurately reflects the party's mutual objectives).
56. See Radin, Reconsidering Boilerplate, supra note 26, at 619, 642-46.
57. And, indeed, govemment mandated rules are a pervasive feature of many adhesive
contracting regimes. Think of the leasing of rental properties, the non-waivability of strict-liability for
product defects, and more. As this Note argues, infra, these are manifestations of a government policy
that implicitly recognizes that social welfare is optimized when the risk of loss is borne by the party best
able to prevent it. See Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and
Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 361-62 (1991) (discussing when such
mandatory defaults are efficient, rather than merely redistributive); see also Katz, supra note 50, at 292
(noting that the "correct economic issue" is "whether giving offerors control over the terms of the
contract does a better job of minimizing transaction costs than does a centralized presumptive
standard").
58. Scholars who do not think that consumer welfare is necessarily the logical foundation of
American law possess divergent views. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 14.
59. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 7, at 827.
60. See, e.g., id. at 828-29 (making this point); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 7, at I160 n.467
(same).
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The view advanced in this Note is orthogonal to the foregoing view. The
thesis set forth is that if courts could discern that certain terms placed risk on
the party for whom bearing the risk was more costly (and it seems that there are
at least some situations in which they can),' then, in those cases, the courts
should invalidate them. 62
One might be tempted to argue that as to primary costs, there may be
instances in which the risk is placed on the party less able to prevent the loss,
but that this term also means that the good or service provided comes at a
discount. In that instance perhaps, one could argue that courts should not
invalidate the term. But, as will be shown in the next Subsection, even if
introducing a suboptimal term results in a discount, it is unclear why courts
should enforce it. If, as a matter of primary costs, society is indifferent between
exchanging the discount for an optimal term, unless there are additional
secondary costs associated with invalidating the term, society would be
indifferent between invalidating the term or upholding it. Moreover, the
opposite is likely to be true: courts are likely to be better able to assess whether
a term places the risk on the party less able to bear it than they are to know
whether a discount to the consumer perfectly counterbalances its suboptimality.
Indeed, discounts may induce consumers to make suboptimal purchasing
decisions because such discounts are highly visible while unfavorable terms are
hidden.63
1. How Cheapest Cost Avoidance Minimizes Primary Costs-An
Explanation with Examples
The notion of the party best able to minimize risk may, at first blush, be
difficult to conceptualize concretely. The issue is made that much more
complicated when dealing with contracts of adhesion because the question is
transformed from the archetypical contract case--one in which courts must
understand who between two parties engaged in a one-off transaction is the
better risk bearer-to another case entirely, one in which the risks of loss (and
therefore the costs of such losses) must be aggregated across potentially
thousands of consumers." In the context of forum selection clauses, liability
waivers, and agreements to submit to binding arbitration, to name some oft-
challenged terms, one might reasonably wonder how a court is to determine
whether the seller or the purchasers (as a class) were in the better position to
minimize the risk of loss when an actual dispute materializes. The answer lies
in looking to the contract to see whether the inclusion of the term, on the whole
across all purchasers, increases or decreases the overall contractual surplus.
61. See infra Subsection .A.I.
62. See supra Subsection I.A.2.
63. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 7, at 1157 & n.458; Korobkin, supra note 2, at 1234.




Sometimes this will demand sophisticated analysis. In the context of a
forum-selection clause, for example, if the stipulation in the contract is that all
lawsuits will be pursued in Miami, even though the purchasers are located in
Detroit, it is not necessarily clear that the term should be invalidated for that
reason alone. After all, one would postulate that the seller's additional cost
from litigating in Detroit in the absence of such a forum selection clause will be
passed on to purchasers. Thus, for at least some purchasers (one imagines the
purchasers who do not end up suing the seller), the forum selection clause will
constitute a savings in the form of a discount on the contract price. It may even
reduce the aggregate cost of the contract overall. For example, it may be
systematically cheaper to pursue claims against the seller in Miami, or
purchasers might be better able than the seller to determine whether litigation is
likely to ensue and be able to plan accordingly.s
However, by requiring that claims be pursued in Miami, the seller now
has an additional incentive to breach the contract in some circumstances
because, on an individual basis, pursuing an individual claim against the seller
is a costly transaction. Thus, in assessing the forum-selection clause the court
would be tasked with looking beyond the clause itself to the mechanics of the
whole contract. If the contract is one in which the seller is tasked with
providing a service for which it is possible to systematically obtain an
advantage by committing small contract breaches, then-because the cost of
litigating in Miami is a barrier to pursuing breach of contract claims-the court
should invalidate the forum-selection term, for it divides the risk of breach
between the two parties in a suboptimal manner.66 If the court strikes down the
forum selection clause, the seller will have to charge more to all, but the
contractual surplus will rise between the seller and its customers because it can
no longer "chisel" on its obligations.
Moreover, this invalidation probably will not create undesirable secondary
costs associated with contracting for the good or service. The only contracts
that now will not be consummated are contracts that were predicated on a
socially suboptimal risk distribution. The contract price will rise, but only
because the initial discount was predicated on a wealth-transfer from some
unlucky subset of parties against whom the seller was able to extract an
inequitable share of the contractual surplus.
65. Although at this point the seller could just write two different contracts (one with and one
without the forum selection clause) and allow purchasers to select between them, thus enhancing the
mutual gain for all involved. Cf Jonathan Klick, supra note 29, at 564-65 (describing how firms can
engage in second-degree price discrimination when customers have different time preferences). This is
done in a variety of consumer contracts, such as the situation in which a rental car company allows
renters to choose whether to purchase optional insurance.
66. Not because the contract inefficiently divides the risk between the parties, but because it
allows one of the parties to impose strategic costs on the other.
67. For more about incentives to chisel on contractual obligations, see Goetz & Scott, supra
note 52, at 977-78, and Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA.
L. REv. 1089, 1115 (1981).
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Or consider the canonical example of an unfair term in contracts of
adhesion: the strict liability waiver. Warranty waivers are frequently included
in contracts of adhesion, although they are also one of the terms frequently
invalidated. The principle that such waivers violate public policy was
famously expounded in the case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,6 9
and at the time of the decision it sent shockwaves through the law of both torts
and contracts. As Dean Prosser wrote six years after Henningsen: "[the decision
ushered in] the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an established
rule in the entire history of the law of torts," as state after state adopted strict
products liability and also made strict liability unwaivable. 70 Yet, almost
twenty-five years after the decision, legal scholars and judges could not agree
on the proper rationale for generally invalidating such warranty waivers, 7 1 and
many still argued that "contract should still have a substantial role in allocating
product safety risks."7 2 In fact, in their Note synthesizing academic
commentary and legal decisions after Henningsen, Peter Kinkaid and Professor
William Stuntz found little suggestion that the waivers were generally invalid
because they arose in contracts of adhesion that inefficiently placed the risk of
loss on the costlier cost avoider. 73
Henningsen itself entirely ignored that rationale, instead placing great
stock in the fact that there were only three automobile manufacturers who
together controlled over ninety-percent of the passenger car market. 74 The court
suggested that the waiver of liability may have been a product of explicit
collusion. 7 Thus, the court in Henningsen relied on the same notion that many
courts do today-the presence of monopoly or unequal bargaining power.7 6
Even Judge Guido Calabresi and Jon Hirschoff s groundbreaking article
explaining the notion of the cheapest cost avoider gave only tepid endorsement
to Henningsen's holding, though it would seem a canonical instance of striking
down a term placing liability on the costlier cost avoider. 77
After all, Henningsen was a case in which an automobile accident was
allegedly caused by a product defect in the steering column,78 precisely the
kind of defect that consumers would have difficulty detecting and
manufacturers would be well positioned to prevent cheaply. Some have
68. See, e.g., Peter M. Kinkaid & William J. Stuntz, Note, Enforcing Waivers in Products
Liability, 69 VA. L. REv. 1111, 1112 (1983).
69. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
70. William L. Prosser, The Fall ofthe Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REV. 791, 791-96 (1966).
71. See Kinkaid & Stuntz, supra note 68, at 1114.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1113.
74. Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 390.
75. Id. at 391.
76. Id.
77. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 7, at 1068.




criticized the decision-and now more or less nationwide rule-that sellers
cannot waive liability for strict liability product defects.79 And perhaps one
might think that the law of contracts could cure this problem-after all, if
manufacturers wanted to continue to waive liability they would have to offer a
discount on the price of the contract in exchange for keeping the inefficient
term.so
Yet rational firms would not include the term unless they thought that
whatever discount they were required to offer was less costly to the firm than
paying liability claims. On this view, it seems plausible that sellers would
waive liability because they believed that, by placing the risk of loss on the
consumer, at least some consumers would purchase a car who otherwise would
not have if they had known the distribution of risk in the fine print. Thus, the
non-waivability of strict liability warranty waivers-itself a deviation from
traditional unconscionability doctrine as currently applied by courts-fits rather
well within a unified theory of contracts of adhesion in which courts invalidate
terms that place the risk of loss on the party less able to take cost-justified
precautions to prevent the loss.
The examples above illustrate that terms in contracts of adhesion can
deviate from the ideal complete contract in two ways. First, by giving
incentives to party A to impose costs on party B that party B is not well-
positioned to monitor or, alternately, by placing the risk of loss on Party B
when avoidance of the loss is more costly for party B than party A. In both
cases the terms decrease the overall contractual surplus when aggregated across
all transactions between the seller and its purchasers. While one might expect
that contracts of adhesion containing suboptimal terms would "price-in" those
terms, if we believe sellers behave rationally, they will not include such terms
unless they are more profitable than actually writing a contract that minimizes
primary costs. Even while these terms mean the seller obtains a larger slice of
the smaller contractual "pie" than it would if it bargained for the ideal complete
contract, the contract's terms decrease overall social welfare because the pie is
not as large as it otherwise could have been.81 As such, placing the risk of loss
79. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 25, at 1310-12 (explaining how efficient warranty terms
depend on the costs to manufacturers of making the product harm resistant, costs to consumers of
avoiding harm, and costs to both of different varieties of insurance against harm-and thus the per se
rule invaliding warranty waivers effectively undercuts any possible welfare-enhancing variation in these
forms of insurance).
80. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 16, at 940-41.
81. Indeed, this is a canonical instance of deadweight loss to society arising from a market
failure, which may be why courts have often conflated inequitable contract terms with unequal
bargaining power. See BORK, supra note 43, at 66, 90-91 (arguing that the primary concern of antitrust
law should be with enhancing consumer welfare). Bork's position so thoroughly infuses the modem law
of antitrust that anticompetitive conduct has become almost synonymous with those practices which lead
to deadweight loss. However, as we have seen in the contracting context, many terms lead to deadweight
loss though they escape antitrust scrutiny. Nonetheless, the rhetoric of contract doctrine concerned with
consumer welfare has inherited this unusual relationship with antitrust through the device of "unequal"
bargaining power, conjuring images of a monopolist or cartel abusing its market power.
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on the cheapest cost avoider is the socially optimal means of distributing
primary costs between parties to a contract of adhesion.
2. An Objection to Easy Cases
The cases presented can be objected to on the grounds that they are too
easy. But it should not be taken as a sign that the rule cannot be applied to more
complex or difficult cases. To this end, consider another frequent term set out
in contracts of adhesion: the written option to return a good for a refund or
exchange within a certain number of days of purchase. This term seems as if it
might place the risk of loss on the party least able to prevent it. After all, once
the item has been purchased from the seller and is in the possession of the
buyer, the buyer might abuse, misuse, use up, or wear out the item and then
attempt to bring it back for a refund or exchange. 82 One might wonder,
therefore, if such a term should be unenforceable because it misallocates the
distribution of risk between buyers and the sellers, increasing the overall cost of
the contract and decreasing the overall contractual surplus across all
purchasers.
But this is not necessarily so. A court tasked with analyzing the
enforceability of the return option-like a court interpreting many contract
disputes under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)-would look more
broadly than the individual term to the broader return policy itself and the
practice of customers and the seller.83 Given that some number of widgets will
be sold with a defect and that therefore the seller will be liable for a breach of
contract in those instances, the seller is formalizing an implicit form of
insurance that abrogates the need to go to court to enforce a contractual right
that many of the purchasers already possess. After all, under the U.C.C.,
purchasers are already entitled to perfect tender. Because the formal rule
requires inspection upon delivery, the real tradeoff in such contracts may be
between the cost of requiring that every purchaser inspect every widget
purchased at the time of purchase, versus the (presumably) lower cost of
allowing purchasers to discover defects through ordinary use while accepting
that some number of purchasers will engage in strategic behavior. Moreover,
sellers commonly reserve the right not to accept goods they suspect have been
broken by the purchaser. Given that it may cost considerably less for the seller
to inspect the small number of goods returned by a subset of consumers for
intentional misuse rather than require that every consumer inspect every widget
at the time it is purchased, it seems eminently reasonable to conclude that a
right-to-return term places the burden on the party best able to prevent the
82. See Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 7, at 833.
83. See U.C.C. § 1-205 (2011).
84. See U.C.C. § 2-601 (2011). This provision of the U.C.C. is, coincidentally, itself likely to
be an efficient contract default as there are likely to be customers indifferent to the defect and the seller




loss-the seller-at least where the seller retains the right to reject returns in
instances of bad faith.ss
B. Minimization of Secondary Costs
While both tort and contract scholars have long understood that placing
the risk of loss on the party best able to take precautions against the loss is
often optimal as a matter of primary costs,8 contract scholars have never gone
so far as to recommend that courts refuse to enforce terms in contracts of
adhesion if they place the risk of loss on the party for whom avoidance is more
costly.87 The oft-cited reasons are what might be termed "secondary costs"-
the collection of costs associated with adjudicating and enforcing legal rules
along with the loss to society that occurs when parties change their behavior in
response to such rules. Yet these scholars have been wrong in their analysis of
the secondary costs. Time and again, they have failed to consider that all
possible solutions to the problems associated with contracts of adhesion involve
secondary costs-including the status quo. The failure to consider that the
status quo represents a suboptimal enforcement regime that itself imposes
significant secondary costs has meant that scholars have overemphasized the
secondary costs of adopting new legal rules even while the status quo continues
to impose significant secondary costs of its own.
This section sets out to make the affirmative case that judicial refusal to
enforce terms that place the risk of loss on the more costly cost avoider actually
minimizes the most salient secondary costs, for four reasons. First, because it
minimizes what might be called the "cost of consent""8 -which is the cost
associated with requiming consumers to actually read, understand, and "shop"
the contracts they sign. Second, because it minimizes the costs associated with
judicially invalidating the wrong terms or enforcing the wrong terms (both of
which are pernicious). Third, because, although it demands that courts analyze
individual contracts on a case-by-case basis, such a governance regime for
contracts of adhesion is likely to be cheaper than the current "fairness" regime,
a legislatively imposed "information forcing" regime, or a regime of legislated
85. Another thesis put forward by Professors Scott and Triantis is that each purchaser is
willing to pay for the option to return as a means of managing uncertainty about how valuable the item
is to him or her individually. This analysis also weighs in favor of generally upholding such terms. Scott
& Triantis, supra note 7, at 1474-75. Yet another theory ofreturn policies is reputational-firms engage
in return policies as a signal of quality and are therefore willing to accept a financial loss in the
contractual surplus in exchange for what they see as a valuable reputational gain. Id. at 1472-73; cf
Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 7, at 833 (arguing that sellers often accept returns even when they do not
specify a right to return merchandise in the contract, and that they do not specify the right precisely
because some customers would use the term to behave strategically).
86. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 7.
87. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 5.
88. Cf Fairfield, supra note 21, at 1422-23 (outlining a version of "cost of consent" that is
similar to this one, but more concerned with information costs associated with the tradeoff between
negotiating custom contracts and employing standard contracts).
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mandatory contract default rules. Fourth, because the rules are no more likely to
push parties off-contract than other regimes, and also vindicate important social
welfare goals within contract, the rule is no more likely than other rules to push
parties to abandon contract.
1. Minimizing the "Cost of Consent"
Contracts of adhesion exist, in large measure, precisely because they
minimize the costs associated with negotiating individual contractual terms.
Yet they still impose costs on consumers to the extent that consumers must
read, understand, and (if dissatisfied with terms) shop them to other sellers. The
goal of designing rules to govern when and whether to invalidate the terms of
such contracts must therefore be sensitive to the degree to which even small
changes in these costs can have large effects on society's overall welfare. This
Subsection, however, argues that invalidating terms that deviate from the
optimal terms minimizes the cost of consent.
To see why, it is useful first to imagine what would happen if all terms in
contracts of adhesion were enforceable as long as customers signed on the
dotted line. It is easy to see that this regime would significantly increase the
cost of consent. 8 9 Buyers would face a significant "market for lemons"
problem: 90 at best they would have to trust that the market had ensured that this
particular seller, on this occasion, had written an efficient contract. At worst,
they would be forced to consult third-parties that could vouch that the terms in
the contracts offered by sellers were fair or equitable.9 Contracting would be a
dangerous activity in which purchasers would have strong incentives to read
and analyze the fine print in order to ensure that sellers had not snuck
unfavorable and opaque terms into the contract. Contracts of adhesion would
become an almost entirely reputational contracting regime, which would make
entry by new firms more difficult and contract innovation more costly.92 The
entire market could break down because even insurance contracts (to guard
against unfavorable contract terms) would themselves need to be read carefully.
These factors strongly counsel that to have an efficient market for contracts of
adhesion, there must be some credible threat that some terms in such contracts
will be unenforceable.
If courts must choose a rule for invalidating some terms in contracts of
adhesion some of the time, the rule that minimizes the cost of consent will be
the rule that allows customers to enter into contracts with sellers with the most
confidence that they do not have to read the terms.
89. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 7, at 1159 n.461.
90. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 487,488-500 (1970).
91. Radin, Reconsidering Boilerplate, supra note 26, at 650.
92. See infra Subsection II.B.4 for more about the threat of pushing parties "off-contract"




Some scholars have proposed that the current unconscionability doctrines
do this job reasonably well-that the best safety-valve is the rule whereby
courts invalidate contract terms that are "radically unexpected." 93 The problem
with this popular solution is that it essentially unmoors contract doctrine from
economics entirely,94 and to the degree that it does not-by, say, imposing a
requirement that courts look to the terms that are ordinarily employed in the
relevant market-it is unlikely to invalidate inefficient terms because
"uniformity among sellers concerning non-salient terms is the expected result
of market pressure whether or not the chosen term is efficient."95 In other
words, the "unfair surprise" and "radically unexpected term" regimes create a
paradox-the more commonly firms employ a socially inefficient term the
more likely courts will be to uphold them.96
More damaging still is that such a rule has at best an ambiguous impact on
the cost of consent, and at worst does little to discourage the authors of
contracts of adhesion from attempting to write contract terms that place the
burden of the loss on the consumer. While the looming threat that courts will
invalidate terms that "go too far" may serve to make the market for contracts of
adhesion more operable, it still demands that a significant subset of consumers
read, understand, and shop the terms in such contracts because not all terms
that deviate from the ideal complete contract between buyers and sellers are
unenforceable. Consumers cannot read the terms of contracts of adhesion that
inefficiently place the risk of loss on them and then leverage their
unenforceability as a means of either driving down the price of the contract or
convincing the seller to remove the term. Instead, consumers must threaten to
procure services from another seller who does not impose the term. Because,
however, there are strong incentives for businesses to adopt industry-wide
standard terms (so as to reduce, ironically, the cost of consent97), this threat is
difficult to make, not likely to be credible, and requires that the consumer
actually obtain more utility from the competing second-choice product than he
loses from the suboptimal contract term.
Their tendency to increase the cost of consent is also why mandatory
disclosure rules,98 information-forcing penalty default rules, and the safe-harbor
93. Barnett, supra note 14, at 637; see Fairfield, supra note 21, at 1447.
94. After all, such an inquiry demands that someone (presumably the judge) determines
whether the terms are unfairly surprising. But even if this determination is made-and it is true that the
terms are surprising-it is unclear why that, on its own, should make an otherwise efficient and
ordinarily desirable term unenforceable. Turning the question around, it is unclear why highly unfair and
inefficient terms should be honored merely because consumers know about them.
95. Korobkin, supra note 2, at 1284.
96. See the analogy set out in note 22, supra.
97. Fairfield, supra note 21, at 1441-44 (noting and describing this phenomenon); Hillman &
Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 435-37 (same).
98. Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information, supra note 25, at 1457-60 (suggesting that a
legislatively mandated disclosure regime and judicial enforcement of all contract terms is superior to a
"general ban" on some terms).
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given by many courts to firms that do not engage in "procedural"
unconscionability" are also suboptimal invalidation regimes. If society's goal
is to minimize the cost of consenting to contracts of adhesion, its goal should
not be to give consumers more information, which only promises that a larger
subset of consumers will be required to read, understand, and shop their terms,
but rather to maximize consumers' confidence that they do not have to do so.
The rule set forth in this Note, that courts should invalidate welfare-
reducing terms, minimizes the cost of consent because it discourages firms
from placing the terms in their contracts in the first instance (as they will not be
enforced) and because it minimizes search or "shopping" costs since consumers
can leverage the unenforceability of the firm's terms directly with the firm
without having to find a competitor offering superior terms. As such, this rule,
more than the status quo and any rule that has been proposed, actually
maximizes the number of consumers who will feel comfortable not reading,
understanding, and shopping the terms in contracts of adhesion and thereby
minimizes the cost of consent.
The rule can be challenged on the grounds that it will create a free-rider or
induced-ignorance problem, however. If consumers become too confident that
inefficient terms will not be enforced, they may stop shopping for better terms
altogether, and thereby fail to induce firms to write efficient contracts through
the market mechanism. In other words, the rule that inefficient terms will be
invalidated may have the perverse effect of "crowding out" consumer search-
inducing consumers to not shop for favorable contract terms, and thereby
creating substantial costs in subsequent adjudication and, by reducing sellers'
confidence that their terms will be enforceable, causing them to shift entirely to
a "second best" regime.1
But this concern seems overblown. As long as litigating unenforceable
terms is not costless-for either buyers or sellers-both have incentives to
avoid them. Buyers will avoid sellers who place unenforceable terms in their
contracts to the extent that the buyer expects to be required to litigate the
term--and the cost of litigating an unfavorable term for a consumer that cares
about the content of the term is almost sure to outweigh the cost of shopping
the term to other firms. On the flip side, sellers also wish to avoid lawsuits to
the extent they are costly to defend, and therefore will only write inefficient
terms if they believe they can obtain greater benefits from the inefficient term
than it costs to have the term litigated and found unenforceable. For such terms
to be favorable enough to the seller to be profitable in light of the threat of a
lawsuit, one imagines it will have to be so obviously one-sided as to deter
customers from contracting with the firm altogether.
462
99. Korobkin, supra note 2, at 1254.
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2. Minimizing the Cost of False Positives
The problems associated with false-positives are also an oft-mentioned
threat to the efficient operation of the market for contracts of adhesion. The
theory is that the problem of accidentally invalidating efficient terms-terms
that should be enforced-counsels against judicial intervention. '0' The theory is
that false positives are in many ways more pernicious than false negatives
because, while the market can correct for inefficient contract terms, once a term
is invalidated by a court firms can no longer write contracts that include the
offending term, even though it is efficient.
But this reflects a misguided status-quo bias. Scholars often ignore that
the failure to invalidate truly inefficient terms is far more pernicious in the
context of contracts of adhesion than a similar judicial refusal to intervene in
the law of antitrust, where incentives to deviate from oligopolistic schemes or
enter markets where prices are artificially elevated can be powerful error-
correctives. 10 2 Unlike antitrust, the very point and purpose of writing terms in
contracts of adhesion is to grant one party a judicially enforceable right against
the other party to the agreement. As such, every instance in which a term is
judicially enforced that should not be is as much of a "false positive" as if the
term were invalidated. While choosing not to intervene in a situation in which a
firm's conduct is ambiguously anticompetitive does not send a signal to other
firms that they may freely engage in the same behavior without threat of
reproach, choosing to enforce a provision in a contract of adhesion signals to
firms that they should feel confident that they can include and obtain
enforcement of the term at issue.
More importantly, an efficient market for contracts of adhesion demands
that the judiciary credibly threaten to invalidate at least some contract terms, or
else the market for such contracts would grind to a halt. 0 3 But if courts must
invalidate at least some terms, the question then becomes which rule among the
rules that might be adopted minimizes false-positives. In that sense, the rule
that invalidates terms because they are inefficient on the basis of an inefficient
distribution of primary costs-rather than a rule based on "fairness" to the
parties, 10 whether entry into the contract was "informed," 05 or whether the
101. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 2, at 1285 ("Judicial determinations of which contract
terms are efficient and which terms are inefficient are subject to a high likelihood of error."); Schwartz
& Wilde, Intervening in Markets, supra note 25, at 678; cf Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 7, at 829
(arguing that these contracts often only appear to offer one-sided terms, but do not in fact); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1, 15-17 (1984) (arguing that the risk of false-
positives in the antitrust context counsels a hands-off judicial approach).
102. See BORK, supra note 43, at 429-39.
103. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Slawson, supra note 2.
105. See, e.g., Michael . Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory
of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1263, 1296 (1993); Christine M. Reilly, Achieving
Knowing and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting
Stage ofEmployment, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1203, 1261 (2002).
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market is truly "non-competitive," 06-is the one least likely to lead to the
invalidation of otherwise efficient terms. After all, application of these other
rules will almost surely lead to the invalidation of efficient terms because they
do not primarily concern themselves with rooting out terms on the basis of their
inefficiency.10 7 If the goal is to minimize false positives, the question is not
"what is the right rule?" but rather "what degree of certainty must judges have
that the term is inefficient?" os The answer to that question depends on several
contingent empirical inquiries. 0 9 Nevertheless, what it reveals is that the rule
proposed in this Note, all things being equal, is the proper one.
3. Minimizing Enforcement Costs
Finally, adopting a judicial rule, enforceable by private plaintiffs, that
merely substitutes inefficient contract terms for judicially-crafted efficient
terms minimizes enforcement costs. Although it demands that courts analyze
individual contracts on a case-by-case basis, such a governance regime is likely
to be cheaper-as a matter of primary and secondary costs-than the current
fairness regime, a penalty-default regime, a legislatively imposed information
forcing regime, or a regime of legislated mandatory contract rules.
This is the case for five interrelated reasons. First, by invalidating terms
on a case-by-case basis judges may tailor remedies such that the reformed
contracts more closely resemble the ideal complete contract that the parties
would have mutually preferred. Second, in rendering judgments on the basis of
evidence and economic analysis, judges give to sellers writing future contracts
the ability to draft in conformity with the judicial rule, thereby reducing the
need for future adjudication. Third, by merely invalidating terms or reforming
contracts rather than imposing penalty or information-forcing defaults, the rule
suggested reduces the cost of consent in future contracts. Fourth, by not
penalizing merchants for writing inefficient terms, the regime minimizes the
106. Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets, supra note 25, at 668 ("[I]t seems wiser to
limit efficiency-motivated interventions to the case of non-competitive markets."). See also David Gilo
& Ariel Porat, Viewing Unconscionability Through a Market Lens, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 133, 133
(2010) ("We suggest that rather than examining each consumer contract in isolation, courts should
inquire whether there is competition, or potential competition, over contracts in the supplier's market.").
107. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 7, at 966.
108. Cf Korobkin, supra note 2, at 1285 (arguing that judicial determination of which terms
are efficient or inefficient is unreliable, and therefore advocating that judges only invalidate inefficient
terms if their inefficiency is clear-and-convincingly proven). This argument is addressed in greater depth
in Subsection II.B.3, infra.
109. This empirical analysis would need to include the likelihood that judges purporting to
apply a particular judicial standard actually apply that standard, see, for example, Bert I. Huang,
Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1111 (2011), the degree to which judges commit errors
even under a particular decisional standard faithfully applied, see, for example, Alan Devlin & Michael
Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 75, 80 (2010), and the degree to which businesses,
consumers, and markets will change their behavior as a result of the invalidation or enforcement of an
inefficient term. See infra Subsection II.B.4 for a discussion ofthe most difficult challenge this problem




threat of driving sellers to abandon contract as a means of vindicating their
aims." 0 Fifth, and most importantly, adjudicating the efficiency of terms in
contracts of adhesion is actually well-within judicial ken because they are not
the product of a bargain between the parties and are therefore far more tort-like
and susceptible to intelligent judicial appraisal than ordinary negotiated
contracts.I
To understand why a system of judicially-crafted efficient (rather than
penalty) defaults is superior to alternatives, it is useful first to consider one
frequent method by which contracts are invalidated: judicial determinations of
unfair surprise, unreasonableness, and unfairness." The problems with this
regime include more than its greater tendency to produce false positives than an
efficiency approach. 13 It often lends no intelligible principles by which future
contract drafters can hope to adapt their contracts of adhesion so as to avoid
future invalidation."l 4 This is because the currently endorsed principles
invalidating contracts are relational-in deciding whether a contract is
unconscionable these rules consider the relative bargaining positions of the
individual parties to the suit-the specific buyer and seller-rather than the
interests of the class of customers as a whole." 5 It is also because the
considerations on which courts rely often relate not to the effect of the term on
the division of the contractual surplus at issue in the case at hand, but on the
relative positions of the parties in the marketplace-focusing on such factors as
"one-sidedness" and "unequal bargaining power.""'6  Remarkably, some
scholars even argue that obviously welfare-reducing terms should be upheld if
110. See infra Subsection II.B.4 for a description of this phenomenon.
111. Cf Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual
Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1023, 1052 (2009) (arguing that parties negotiate and design agreements in
reliance on expectations about how courts will construe them, counseling against judicial deviation from
formalistic interpretive principles if one believes that it is welfare maximizing to vindicate the specific
intent-rather than contractual objectives or aims-of the parties).
112. Gilo & Porat, supra note 106, at 137 ("The question of whether to strike down such a
clause is generally determined by courts according to a combination of three considerations, mostly
under the doctrine of unconscionability: first, the information gap between the supplier and his
consumers, which exists when consumers are not aware of the full-value loss the clause entails; second,
whether the supplier enjoys superior bargaining power; third, the degree of harshness, or one-sidedness,
of the clause."); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 456 ("Thus, the limited role of the courts in
policing standard terms has been to bar only those terms that offend public norms. The courts have
developed legal doctrines that curb form abuse largely from three sources: the unconscionability
doctrine, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 211(3), and the doctrine of reasonable
expectations.").
113. See supra Subsection II.B.2.
114. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 7, at 1161.
115. See Baird, supra note 16, at 944-46 (criticizing the decision in Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), on similar grounds).
116. Gilo & Porat, supra note 106, at 137 (noting that "information gap[s]," "harshness,"
"one-sidedness," and "superior bargaining power" are all common factors in modern judicial analyses of
unconscionability).
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courts find the markets in which the firms are writing contracts to be essentially
competitive because then the terms are likely to be desired.117
Another approach has been one of "information forcing"-designed, as
the name suggests, either to force merchants to reveal the one-sided terms in
their contracts to consumers, 11 penalize them for hiding such terms,1 or
require that they prophylactically disclose material facts about the quality and
condition of their products and services as a means of improving the degree to
which consumers are informed. 120 The problem with all of these approaches is
that they increase the costs of consent because they all depend on requiring
consumers who would otherwise be rationally uninformed about the boilerplate
terms in the contracts that they sign to read, understand, and assent to them
even if they are indifferent to the unfavorable terms. This elevates costs for all
services and goods, even those rendered by honest sellers,12 1 and across the
board for all consumers, in terms of both time and cognitive resources invested
in entering into contracts-all so that what might be a small number of
consumers are protected from unscrupulous inefficient contract terms.
Information, it seems, is often put forward as a cure because it does not entail
disruption of the fundamental market mechanism, and allows us to move closer
to a market with "perfect" information. But this does not logically mean that it
should be the solution that we favor. There are strong reasons to think that
minimizing the need to read and understand the terms in contracts of adhesion
should be a central goal as long as the terms can be made to be efficient as
well. 122
Mandatory contract default rules-wherein the State or an agency impose
form terms on every merchant transaction-have long been recognized as
suboptimal because they do not grant flexibility to design innovative
117. Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets, supra note 25, at 668 (arguing that
efficiency-motivated interventions should be limited to non-competitive markets). See also Gilo &
Porat, supra note 106, at, 133 ("We suggest that rather than examining each consumer contract in
isolation, courts should inquire whether there is competition, or potential competition, over contracts in
the supplier's market."). Part I, supra, argues that the overriding concern with discovering whether
markets can police inefficient terms that seems to drive scholars toward this approach is fundamentally
misguided.
118. See, e.g., Steven W. Thomas, Note, Utmost Good Faith in Reinsurance: A Tradition in
Need of Adjustment, 41 DUKE L.J. 1548, 1553 (1992). But see Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts
Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 794-95 (2002) (noting that
no one reads contracts of adhesion even when information-forcing rules are in place).
119. See Korobkin, supra note 2, at 1288-89 (arguing for limiting enforcement of
unconscionable contracts "to deter other sellers from similar bad faith or carelessness").
120. See Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets, supra note 25, at 668 (advocating such an
approach in non-competitive markets).
121. Mandating prophylactic disclosure entails significant costs, including the cost to maintain
and run an agency or institutional regulator, the cost to police the disclosures, and the cost to firms of
producing the information. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Unintended
Consequences of Mandatory Disclosure, 73 TEX. L. REV. 753, 785-86 (1995) (making these points in
the analogous context of mandatory disclosures under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
122. See supra Subsection I.B. 1.
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contracts. 123 One must concede, however, that such rules are cheap to enforce:
all judges are required to determine is whether the contracts conform to the
mandatory rules. But it is easy to see that mandatory rules are not likely to be
well-tailored to the thousands of different possible products and services
markets to which they might be required to apply. As such, mandatory rules
would almost surely demand that courts enforce inefficient, welfare-reducing
terms simply because those terms are required by the state. This inability to
tailor means that while the direct costs of enforcement are low, overall social
welfare is almost sure to be diminished just as a matter of primary contract
costs. 124
What is more, increasing the cost of entering into contracts of adhesion
across the board-by requiring greater information disclosure or conformance
with state mandated default rules-will also have the perverse effect of causing
firms to substitute other means in the place of contract, a result that could
reduce social welfare. 125
Judicial invalidation of inefficient contract terms, on the other hand,
preserves the market's balance of information-costs because it neither penalizes
sellers for including the terms in the contracts,126 nor requires consumers that
are rationally ignorant of the terms in the contracts that they sign to become
informed even though they plan to sign the contract anyway. 1 Rather, if
consumers have confidence that such terms are invalid, those that care are more
likely to attempt to negotiate the terms with the seller (to reduce the costs
associated with a lawsuit to invalidate the term), and those that do not care will
not feel as if they must read the contracts carefully because they can be
confident that if the terms are inefficient they will be invalidated at a later date.
All of this reduces the cost of consent.
Most importantly, contrary to contemporary scholarly consensus, judges
would seem to be eminently capable of policing inefficient terms in contracts of
adhesion. Scholars have repeatedly asserted, often at the outset of their Articles,
without evidence, and before proceeding to discuss their superior suggested
123. See, e.g., Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information, supra note 25, at 1456-59.
124. For a description of primary costs, see supra note 44.
125. See infra Subsection I1.B.4.
126. An approach advocated by Korobkin, supra note 2, at 1289, in order to deter sellers from
placing sub-optimal terms in the contracts that consumers will believe are enforceable. This seems like
the wrong approach. While sellers may be tempted to place terms that skirt the edge of enforceability, it
is not clear why Korobkin believes they must be penalized for placing sub-optimal terms in their
contracts in order to prevent them from including them-after all, it only takes a single lawsuit to
invalidate the term. If not even one consumer brings a claim, it would seem to me the one-sidedness of
the term would be open to question.
127. An approach advocated by Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets, supra note 25, at
635, who take the roundabout approach of hypothesizing that if consent is what we want, then giving
consumers more information is the best approach to ensuring consent. Because consent is not
necessarily what we want, Schwartz & Wilde's proposal rests on vulnerable premises. Yet, their solution
is unfortunately often repeated without the caveat limiting its scope. See, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinski,
supra note 3, at 442.
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alternatives,128 that courts "have difficulty distinguishing between terms that
create a reasonable arrangement of risks and terms that constitute exploitation
of consumers," 29 and that "requiring courts to determine de novo whether
particular terms are efficient or inefficient would strain the bounds of judicial
competence and invite a high error rate." 130 And this incompetence, they argue,
would create "tremendous uncertainty" that would make it hard for drafters of
contracts of adhesion to be confident in the enforceability of their contracts
going forward.131
To the extent that reasons are given for this lack of faith in the judiciary,
three seem most salient. 132 First, and most powerfully, judges are prone to
focusing on ruling on the case before them and not on the aggregate policy at
stake for all parties to the contract.133 Second, contractual efficiency is a
contingent empirical question, and courts simply do not have the facts and
cannot gather them.134 Third, judges are not well suited to deciding cases
involving businesses and their customers because they lack the relevant
business experience. 35
The third of the aforementioned arguments seems easy enough to
overcome. Judges do not have to be criminals to understand how criminals are
likely to behave. Generalist judges are called upon to decide highly fact-bound
and complex antitrust cases that often result in treble judgments that can run
into the billions of dollars, even though judges are not economists. Yet, at the
same time, these scholars argue we should not trust them to determine whether
a mandatory arbitration clause in a form consumer contract is efficient or not.
The judicial system is founded on an expectation that judges are capable of
reading, absorbing, and understanding enough to make the right decision, even
in complicated cases. If this is partly a myth, it is a myth upon which the justice
system constantly relies and it has for the most part operated quite well. The
judiciary's appellate process preserves a robust system of institutional error
correction. Judges seem capable of grasping elementary psychology and
128. Barnett, supra note 14, at 633-34; Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 441; Kennedy,
supra note 37, at 597-604; Korobkin, supra note 2, at 1253; Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets,
supra note 25, at 678-82; Karl N. Llewellyn, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in English
and Continental Law, 52 HARv. L. REv. 700, 704 (1939) (book review).
129. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 441 (citing MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITs
OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 101 (1993); and Craswell, supra note 57, at 363).
130. Korobkin, supra note 2, at 1253 (citing, inter alia, Llewellyn, supra note 128, at 704).
131. Id.
132. There are others. See Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information, supra note 25, at 1458-
59 (arguing that firms are so unlikely to write contracts with inefficient terms that judicial intervention
will simply do more harm than good).
133. See, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 441 & n.65.
134. See, e.g., Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets, supra note 25, at 678-82.




economic theory,' which is enough to successfully determine whether
contract terms are efficient or inefficient given awareness of all the facts.
That judges cannot obtain the relevant facts seems to underlie the second
objection. Those who take this view argue that courts and litigants simply
cannot reliably know why a term was placed in a contract of adhesion, and
even if they could, cannot determine ex post whether that decision was efficient
ex ante.' 37 But this argument becomes weaker when one considers contracts of
adhesion. In an ordinary contract case there could be some question as to why a
particular term was placed in the contract-perhaps each party had a different
understanding of the purpose the provision was meant to serve. But such
problems do not arise in contracts of adhesion cases. Because contracts of
adhesion are "take-it-or-leave-it" propositions, it is the seller who placed the
term in the contract, and therefore courts should expect that the seller can
provide the court an economic justification for drafting the term it did. But if
we expect that sellers can provide such economic justifications, then it seems
difficult to argue that courts cannot understand and assess both the credibility
and economic rationality of the arguments made to them.
The foregoing justifications would seem sufficient in themselves to
overcome the final objection that courts are prone to focusing on ruling on the
case before them rather than on the aggregate policy implications of their
decisions. After all, as their record in antitrust cases reveals, judges are
extraordinarily aware of and sensitive to the implications of their decisions on
other future cases. Indeed, that is why they write precedent-setting opinions,
so that they may be held to the principles upon which they decided the prior
case.139 Far from breeding "uncertainty," the judiciary's very fidelity to
principled decision-making makes the law more certain and easier to
understand and apply.140
Even more, however, it would seem that weighing whether the terms in
contracts of adhesion are efficient or inefficient would be almost perfectly
136. See BORK, supra note 43, at 277 ("[C]orrect antitrust rules require only basic economics
and ... are capable of easy and precise application by courts"); id. at 8 ("[The tenets of basic economics
can be made] clear both to the lawyer unfamiliar with economics and to the economist innocent of law,
as well as to those . . . who have previously escaped formal involvement in either field."); Michael R.
Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? The Impact ofEconomic
Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals, 54 J.L. & ECON. 1, 20 (2011); Richard A. Epstein, The
Perilous Position of the Rule of Law and the Administrative State, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5, 8
(2013).
137. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 2, at 1284-85.
138. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921)
(arguing that for several reasons "adherence to precedent should be the rule and not the exception").
139. See, e.g., William Blumenthal, Introductory Note, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 813, 820 (1997)
("[Jiudicial decisions have the attributes of a public good.").
140. See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, Economics and Consumer Protection, 60 ANTITRUST L.J.
103, 104 (1991) ("Litigation produces not just a resolution of the dispute before the court-which is
what the parties are primarily, if not exclusively, interested in-but it also often produces a precedent to
guide others, usually in the form of a written opinion. Many can obtain the benefit of that precedent for
their legal planning without paying for it.").
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analogous to judging in tort cases, an area in which law and economics has had
its most profound impact. Torts calls upon judges to take account of myriad
social facts in deciding which party (as a class) is better positioned to take
optimal precautions against an accident, a determination most famously set out
by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. where he held
that negligence is the failure to take cost-justified precautions. 14 1 In contracts of
adhesion, rather than looking at society as a whole and the generalized
interactions of those in it, courts are tasked with looking at the incentive
structure for the class of participants on each side of a contract created by its
terms.142 Moreover, as this Note has argued, the approach to determining the
welfare-maximizing liabilities developed for tort law can be imported to the
law of contracts of adhesion to the extent that the law of contracts of adhesion
is analogous to torts.
Contracts of adhesion and torts are very similar. In both instances, unlike
negotiated contracts, the parties have not bargained over the specific terms of
their relationship. In both instances, the optimal judicial rule will be the one
that makes their interactions efficient ex ante rather than fair ex post.143 In both
instances the relevant facts are unlikely to be obscure and the specific contours
of their interaction are not likely to be complex, because in such cases it would
be cost-justified for them to negotiate a particular arrangement rather than settle
for the defaults (here, the defaults set out in the contract of adhesion).
In other words, the longstanding arguments that judges are unlikely to be
able to determine the efficiency of terms in contracts of adhesion has served as
a convenient reason to sidestep the issue, rather than engage with the
substantive analysis necessary to determine which terms judges should
invalidate. In fact, judges are likely to be eminently capable of deciding
whether the terms in such contracts are inefficient and capable of invalidating
them with clarity, predictability, and minimal disruption to the legal system.
Scholars and courts have, it seems, sought to avoid inelegant and complex
factual inquiries into the efficiency of the terms of contracts of adhesion in
favor of market solutions predicated on the provision of greater information
and consumer choice,14 5 when, in fact, such judicial inquiries are likely to be a
more efficient means of invalidating inefficient terms.
141. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
142. See Radin, Reconsidering Boilerplate, supra note 26, at 619, 642-46.
143. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
144. See George M. Cohen, The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20
HOFSTRA L. REv. 941, 946-49 (1992).
145. See, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 441.
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4. Minimizing "Off-Contract" Circumventions
One of the most powerful and underappreciated problems with making
any change to legal rules occurs when such changes induce parties to leave the
regime entirely. This Note terms this phenomenon going "off-contract" because
the parties are no longer using the law of contract to vindicate whatever
interests they have.14 6 The argument is that "where the conditions for optimality
cannot be fully satisfied, correction of the flaws in only some of the conditions
will not necessarily lead to an improved outcome."147 If, therefore, the law of
contract becomes too costly, parties may simply stop writing contracts and shift
to a system of trading on unenforceable reputational normsl48 or choose to
embed what would have been inefficient contract terms into the products
themselves (by making, say, a piece of software one would have been
contractually barred from copying break if copied).14 9 If this happens, it may be
the case that an otherwise optimal rule for invalidating terms in contracts of
adhesion has actually made everyone worse off.'50 Even though the terms
inside the domain of contract law are optimal, sellers will resort to a domain
less optimal than contract law to avoid them because contracting as a vehicle
for engaging in market transactions is too costly to vindicate their goals.' 5 ' The
set of rules governing the invalidation of contract terms has pushed them "off-
contract."15 2
146. See Stephen F. Williams, Second Best: The Soft Underbelly ofDeterrence Theory in Tort,
106 HARV. L. REv. 932, 933 (1993).
147. Id.
148. See Bebehuk & Posner, supra note 7, at 828 (arguing that legally imposed "balanced"
contracts could impose costs on sellers and buyers alike that are ordinarily controlled by sellers'
reputational concerns).
149. See Baird, supra note 16, at 939; Douglas G. Baird, Commercial Norms and the Fine Art
ofthe Small Con, 98 MICH. L. REv. 2716, 2720-22 (2000); Radin, Reconsidering Boilerplate, supra note
26, at 645-46.
150. See Baird, supra note 16, at 937 ("There is no way to answer this question with certainty,
but the risk of advantage-taking with respect to boilerplate seems less than with respect to other hidden
attributes. One can cheat buyers by exploiting their ignorance of a product attribute, but everything
suggests that an unscrupulous seller is likely to gain more from hidden attributes other than boilerplate.
Sellers inclined to mischief will direct their attention to the places where the potential gains are the
largest and the costs smallest. By this standard, fine print is an exceedingly poor candidate for would-be
advantage-takers.").
151. There is a hidden normative claim in all this-namely that there is such a thing as a
"domain" of contract law. Schwartz and Scott have attempted to bridge this gap, arguing that "contract
law should facilitate the efforts of contracting parties to maximize the joint gains (the 'contractual
surplus') from transactions" and that "the state should choose the rules that regulate commercial
transactions according to the criterion of welfare maximization." Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003). In theory, this may
mean that if parties want to employ extralegal norms rather than enforceable terms, courts should
vindicate that interest.
152. One might think the move away from courts to mandatory arbitration is a manifestation
of the phenomenon of going "off-contract." See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & J.W. Montgomery, III,
The Lawlessness ofArbitration, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 355 (2003); Knapp, supra note 118.
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This objection is powerful for two reasons. First, it embodies a real
phenomenon that scholars have recognized may already be at work-namely,
the shift away from contract to reputation and the shift away from written terms
to "embedded" terms (where the product or service itself is structured in such a
way as to vindicate what would have otherwise been a written term). Second, it
raises deep questions about the utility (and even the ability) of contract rules to
structure social relationships. If sellers can simply opt-in to the law of contract
when it suits them, and opt-out otherwise, it is unclear if any legal regime can
govern market transactions in a manner capable of enhancing the overall social
welfare of consumers. 153
Bebchuk and Posner have argued that reputational norms are far more
constraining than the enforceable law of contract, and therefore, courts should
enforce even harsh, one-sided and seemingly inefficient terms precisely
154because sellers enforce them at the risk of their own reputations.1 In such a
world, consumers could in fact exploit a contract regime of "balanced" terms to
their advantage-using, for instance, a written promise to accept returned
merchandise for a refund as an opportunity to return goods that they have
intentionally misused. Better, in their view, to allow the seller to omit the term
but then accept returns at its own discretion without granting consumers an
enforceable right of return.s55 Their model can easily be extended and used to
justify an enforce-in-every-case contract regime, wherein courts and judges
simply accept that the reputation-market will regulate merchant conduct and
terms will not be enforced if they damage a firm's good will or reputation.156
From a completely different angle, Baird has described, and Radin has
suggested, that firms can easily substitute physical changes to products or
services to achieve the same ends they might have through written terms in
contracts of adhesion.157 Baird argues that this makes much of the debate about
whether terms in form consumer contracts are efficient or inefficient pointless,
as whatever enforcement regime the courts choose, sellers will work around it
by "building" the terms into their physical products or services. 158 Radin has
argued that such a regime shows there is no normative distinction between the
law of products liability and contracts where such substitutions can be made-
because making it physically impossible to copy software (for example) is
analogous to a rule that one may not copy it.
The issue these alternatives to contract raise is whether refusing to enforce
terms that place the risk of loss on the costlier cost avoider will push parties
153. See Williams, supra note 146, at 934.
154. Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 7, at 830.
155. Id. at 833.
156. Id. at 834.
157. See Baird, supra note 16, at 939; Baird, supra note 149, at 2720-22; Radin,
Reconsidering Boilerplate, supra note 26, at 645-46.
158. Baird, supra note 16, at 939.




off-contract, reducing consumer welfare overall. For instance, sellers might
now spend more to circumvent the judicial invalidation of the inefficient terms
than is saved by preventing them from drafting them. Or sellers might be
unable to offer contracts that are as welfare enhancing as they once did because
consumers will exploit the "balanced" terms they are required to write.
One answer to this question is analogous to the answer given to the
rejoinder that inefficient terms come at a discount-even if the inefficient terms
mean the price is discounted, there is no reason to believe that the inefficient
term is perfectly counterbalanced by the discount. Invalidating inefficient terms
may mean that sellers will substitute the inefficient term by chiseling on
product quality. But it may not be the case that the two are perfect substitutes,
and there is good reason to believe that it is easier to hide inefficient terms in
fine print than to hide corner-cutting on products and services themselves.
Perhaps a better answer is that courts can take into account the possibility
of parties going off-contract when ruling on the efficiency or inefficiency of
contract terms. Indeed, if firms fear that consumers will exploit balanced terms,
it is unclear why they cannot write contracts that bring to the courts' attention
their concern with this possibility. One could imagine that a firm under the
Bebchuk and Posner model would seek to waive strict liability for all injuries,
but then would compensate those customers who were injured when it was
truly a result of product defect and not customer negligence or malfeasance in
order to preserve the firm's reputation. But if the firm can articulate welfare-
enhancing reasons for drafting a term that on its face appears unfair or
inefficient, why not simply demand that the firm explain the reason for the
term?160 It is unclear why this would not be preferable to hanging the Sword of
Damocles (in the form of the drafters' unilateral right to exercise its harsh or
one-sided contract terms) over every contract of adhesion into which
consumers might enter. If firms want their contracts enforceable only when
customers engage in strategic behavior, it is unclear why they cannot write the
contract in precisely this way.
The phenomenon of circumventing invalidated terms by embedding the
terms in the product itself poses a more difficult problem because it may very
well be welfare-reducing to drive firms to engage in such workarounds. Yet,
perhaps ironically, the very terms that are most likely to be embedded in the
product if invalidated are terms that are likely to be salient to customers,
subject to market competition, and therefore efficient. Thus, if courts analyze a
term that could be built into the product itself, the likelihood is that the term
will be one that was written in, rather than built in, for a reason.
There is no perfect solution to the phenomenon of driving parties off-
contract, and it is hard to say that any particular rule for invalidating contracts
160. Cf Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 591 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "it is not burdensome to give reasons when reasons exist").
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of adhesion will optimally prevent parties from going off-contract. This is a
pervasive problem with analyses of the second-best alternative in any legal
regime. Perhaps the best that can be said is that as it pertains to some of the
most important terms consumers seek to invalidate-mandatory arbitration
clauses, forum selection clauses, and strict liability waivers-it is unclear how
the seller could circumvent the clause by shifting to a second-best alternative
and therefore the threat is nebulous.
HI. Conclusion
While it may appear that the rule this Note proposes will result in courts
invalidating more terms in contracts of adhesion, the opposite is more likely to
be true. The purpose of this Note is not to advocate that courts invalidate more
or fewer terms in contracts of adhesion, but that they invalidate the right terms.
The conclusion this Note draws is that courts should sometimes invalidate
terms in contracts of adhesion, if the terms reduce overall consumer welfare,
and that the terms that reduce consumer welfare are those that place the risk of
loss on the costlier cost-avoider or that grant an option to one of the parties to
impose non-reciprocal costs on the other.
161. See Williams, supra note 146, at 934.
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